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Abstract—Ernst Cassirer has been proclaimed a follower of 
Hermann Cohen. However, Cassirer modified the basic 
concepts of Cohen’s theory of knowledge, so that Cassirer’s 
philosophical positions in many aspects actually stand in 
opposition to Cohen’s. Although Cassirer did follow Cohen’s 
methodology coherently, in that path he refuted the main 
positions of his teacher. Cohen’s philosophical task was 
forwarding Kant’s critical method to construct a theory of 
knowledge. He aimed not only to renew Kant’s method in the 
way he interpreted it, but also to revise, in accordance with 
Kant’s method, the uncritical positions of Kant's own theory of 
knowledge. Cohen’s methodology was intended to achieve this 
goal. In following his teacher’s task, however, Cassirer 
developed a set of functional concepts which coherently reveal 
and overturn the uncritical positions in the theory of 
knowledge, including the one essential for Cohen himself. 
Consequently, it may be said, Cassirer “revises” Cohen’s 
system in a same way that Cohen revised Kant. 
Keywords—Hermann Cohen; Ernst Cassirer; function and 
substance; Marc-Wogau; symbol 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ernst Cassirer was the most prominent philosopher of 
Hermann Cohen’s disciples. In the Davos dispute between 
Cassirer and Heidegger, famous in the philosophy of 20th 
century, Cassirer said: “I do not conceive of my own 
development as a defection from Cohen” [1]. The dispute 
took place in 1929, two years after Cassirer published the 
third volume of his magnum opus “The Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms” (PSF) — his philosophical inquiry of 
culture, aimed to enlarge the theory of knowledge 
(epistemology) to a theory of culture — and as became 
evident from his words, Cassirer considered this enlargement 
to be worked out in accordance with Cohen’s philosophy. 
However, my argument is that Cassirer actually modified the 
basic concepts of Cohen’s epistemology. As a result, 
Cassirer’s philosophy leads to a worldview which in many 
respects stands in opposition to Cohen’s. In this paper I will 
trace the development of Cassirer’s thought from the 
premises of Cohen’s and stress the points where Cassirer 
distanced himself from his teacher.  
Cohen, the founder of Marburg’s school of Neo-Kantian 
philosophy, declared his philosophical task to be a 
movement "back to Kant". However, as Cassirer noticed, 
many German philosophers after Kant claimed the similar 
thing [2]. There were metaphysical and psychological 
interpretations of Kant. But Cohen differed from all others. 
He proposed to interpret Kant in light of Kant’s new theory 
of experience, known as the “Copernican revolution”, that is, 
Kant’s revolutionary move in which the theory of knowledge 
becomes the theory of experience. This means that the 
conceptual tools for acquiring the knowledge of nature 
determine this knowledge. Kant's critical method aimed to 
examine and advance this revolution. Experiences are not 
perceived by sense data; rather they are shaped by the 
powers of the mind, that is, dynamic functional judgments — 
the concepts of understanding. However, whereas Kant’s 
epistemology included two sources of knowledge — 
concepts and intuition, that is, the forms of time and space 
for organization of sense data, Cohen’s philosophical task 
was to revise Kant’s concepts [13], [20]; he wanted to give a 
rational explanation for intuition and sense data, that is, to 
define them as dynamic judgments (Urteil) [12]. Cohen 
united time and space with concepts of understanding and 
defined sense data in terms of infinitesimal mathematical 
elements. In addition to intuition and sense data, the other 
problematic moment in Kant’s theory is the thing-in-itself – 
the unattainable end of knowledge. Cohen transformed the 
thing-in-itself into the idea of complete knowledge, equally 
unreachable, but, unlike Kant’s thing-in-itself, within the 
borders of knowledge; it is the infinite task of knowledge. 
The task — a complete idea of knowledge — is the ideal, 
and it defines a primary direction of scientific investigation. 
Cohen’s infinitesimals as well as the infinite task are both 
process-concepts, directed to a definite point. For Cohen 
these concepts were completely different from the “stony” 
presence of sense data elements (starre Gegebenkeiten) [20]. 
He was convinced, therefore, that his methodology 
completed Kant’s critical method. Nevertheless, the 
prejudged process directing investigation to a given point 
reifies this process, and in so doing erases the difference 
between it and static existing elements, such as substance. 
My goal in what follows is to show how Cassirer, following 
Cohen’s methodology, eliminated Cohen’s concepts, and in 
so doing went beyond Cohen in his interpretation of 
knowledge. I will argue that the first divergence Cassirer 
made from Cohen’s philosophy was by the introduction of 
the functional concept, based purely on relation. He 
developed the functional concept into the concept of symbol, 
which, I argue, is an inconsistent concept that leads to 
double-thinking. Using the work of Cassirer’s and 
discussions by scholars, I will argue that the inconsistency of 
the concept serves as the main means by which substantive 
elements in Cohen’s and other epistemologies may be 
overcome. 
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II. FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT 
Cassirer started his philosophical career as a student of 
the founder of the Marburg school, Hermann Cohen, and 
developed his philosophy of knowledge in harmony with the 
Marburg school methodology. This methodology included 
the following principal premises: first, negation of any given 
element in the process of cognition; second, use of the 
transcendental method, that is, the direction of investigation 
is from facts to conditions of knowledge; third, the direction 
of investigation is defined by the given task — a complete 
idea of knowledge; fourth is a unity of system [21] However, 
Cassirer made a significant shift from Marburg methodology 
already in his book Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff 
(SF), written in 1910. The subject of this book is a theory of 
concept in accordance with the development of mathematics 
and the natural sciences. Cassirer followed the development 
of the generic-concept (Gattungsbegriff) to the function-
concept or functional concept [8]. Cassirer’s discussion 
begins with Aristotle's metaphysics. Aristotle distinguished 
between the mode of existence of individual things and the 
mode of existence of relations and attributes. The mode of 
existence of the former is called substance. This existence is 
independent, not bound by the existence of other things. In 
contrast, relations and attributes depend on the existence of 
things, so their existence is incomplete. Since Aristotle, the 
independent existence of substance is considered to be the 
model of existence. This model Cassirer called substantial 
existence or the substantial approach to existence. The theory 
of generic concepts is an outcome of the substantial kind of 
existence. The generic-concept is created by a common 
property of existing things. For example, by seeing many 
strong people, the concept of “strong” is generated. All 
people with strong bodies are subsumed in one group, under 
the concept of “strong”. Cassirer emphasizes that this kind of 
concept formation matches the model of substantial 
existence, because this concept is part of reality. He noticed 
that the generic-concept might appear to be an arbitrary 
selection of one attribute, if it were not considered to be a 
real existence. So the concept “strong” was not perceived as 
a quality abstracted or taken from different people and 
animals, but as ultimate existence, a real essence of 
“strength”. The essence of “strength” is as real as the 
existence of any individual thing. The generic-concept of 
“strong” is thus rooted in substantial existence, according to 
which substance is the real essence of things whose existence 
does not depend on other things or conditions, but it is the 
source for the existence of all strong things. For this reason, 
the generic concept and individual things are both substances 
that have the same mode of existence. So Cassirer calls 
generic concept “thing-concept” (Dingbegriff).  
Cassirer states that it was Kant who made a revolution in 
the theory of concept. The Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” 
aimed to turn the thing-concept into the function of cognition 
[6]. This change in fact signified the change from a 
substantial to a functional mode of existence. According to 
this, the concept is not a quality abstracted from individual 
things as is the generic concept, but becomes the function 
which determines the order of moments in the series F(a, b, 
c) [8]. This new notion of concept Cassirer called the 
functional concept (Funktionbegriff) that is dynamic concept 
which works as function. Function defines the relations 
between moments in the series. It means that moments are 
the inner components of relation, but relation is prior to 
them, and there is nothing outside of relation, no anchor, 
upon which relation depends. Function F does not exist as a 
member of a series; its mode of existence is completely 
different from theirs. The difference between function and 
members denotes the gap between the generic-concept and 
the functional concept. For example, the concept of “strong” 
is in defining conditions by which people considered to be 
less or more strong in relation to others. In contrast to the 
generic concept of “strength” which is abstracted from strong 
people, the strong individual does not exist as substance, nor 
does “strength” exist as a substance. Every strong person 
relates in some way to the concept of “strength”, which is 
why they are called “strong”. While the generic-concept 
exists in the same mode as a thing derived from and 
perceived by the senses, the functional concept exists as pure 
relation. There is no absolute individual being who is the 
strong person, but the quality of being strong is for a moment 
defined in comparison to strong moments of others. The 
functional concept presupposes that the relation has priority 
over existing elements. Cassirer makes the radical statement 
that there is no meaning for existing elements: “the meaning 
of all objective judgment depends on various relations” [10]. 
Therefore, for Cassirer both the function of the series and the 
moments of the series escape the substantial mode of 
existence. The function is not a condition for the existence of 
things, but it defines and organizes the relations between 
moments. The function-concept correlates to the change of 
“substantial” existence into “functional”, which defines the 
relations between qualities as constitutive components of 
reality. 
Cassirer’s functional approach to concept seems perfectly 
to match the Marburg school methodology to free the 
process of cognition from any given sensory elements. His 
difference from Cohen is evident in two points: the 
annulment of foundation, and the annulment of the task. For 
the first: according to the Marburg school, a function that 
determines the relations between members of the series 
requires a foundation, that is, a principle of reality. Although 
this foundation is not identified with sensory elements, it has 
to be based on non-sensory reality -thinkable reality. For 
Cohen, this foundation is defined by infinitesimal 
mathematical elements. There is a continuum of smaller and 
larger in degree, the smallest of which is diminution to zero. 
There is no person without some degree of strength, but this 
quality can be diminished almost to zero. These are thinkable 
elements, but for Cohen thinkable mean real [14]. Unlike 
him, Cassirer eliminates any solid foundation and defines 
relation as the only foundation for function. The functional 
concept is pure relation, he argues. Concept becomes 
relational concept. It does not define the relationship 
between infinitesimals, but of two moments, whose existence 
is dependent only on relation. After reading Cassirer’s proofs 
of Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff Cohen become 
aware of Cassirer’s shift from his teaching. His critique of 
Cassirer’s relational concept was expressed in a letter of 24 
Aug. 1910 to his student. Cohen insisted that relation alone 
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cannot define function and that it needs real infinitesimal 
elements: “...I still cannot discard as wrong what I told you 
in Marburg: you put the center of gravity upon the concept of 
relation and you believe that you have accomplished with the 
help of this concept the idealization of all materiality. The 
expression even escapes you, that the concept of relation is a 
category only insofar as it is function, and function 
unavoidably demands the infinitesimal element in which 
alone the root of the ideal reality can be found”[15]. 
As for the second: Cassirer’s definition of function 
eliminates the notion of task. For Cohen, the task for the 
theory of knowledge is approaching knowledge — this 
approach is without end, since to reach complete knowledge 
is impossible. This task gives a primary direction to the 
investigation. Cohen’s infinitesimals as well as the infinite 
task of epistemology are process-concepts directed to a point 
that they can never reach. Therefore, for Cohen, they avoid 
substantive existence.
1
 The task, together with infinitesimals, 
both exist in an absolute manner, and as such they are 
remainders of substance in Cohen’s writing. In contrast to 
Cohen, Cassirer’s priority of relation over any kind of reality 
destroys the task and allows multiple directions, because no 
preconceived path is given. Yet what remains consistent in 
Cassirer’s relational concept is the mode of relation between 
moments. This mode directs the order of moments, but does 
not determine the outcome. It constitutes a direction, but 
does not have any goal-oriented task. The mode of relation is 
also identified by Cassirer with “the guiding point of view”. 
“In truth, it will be seen that a series of contents in its 
conceptual ordering may be arranged according to the most 
divergent points of view; but only provided that the guiding 
point of view itself is maintained unaltered in its qualitative 
peculiarity” [9]. It is still unclear here what “mode of 
relation” or “the guiding point of view” is. These points 
became more explicit in the Cassirer’s later development of 
the relational concept into the concept of symbol. This will 
be clarified below.  
III. FROM RELATIONAL CONCEPT TO THE CONCEPT OF 
SYMBOL 
Whereas in SF Cassirer investigated the concept within 
mathematical and physical sciences, in PSF he aimed to 
show how the previously investigated relational concept 
works within the domain of the cultural sciences.
2
 To begin 
with his aim was to broaden the critique of epistemology to a 
critique of culture. For this he had to transform the concept 
— the main tool for epistemological research — to a concept 
suited to the inquiry of culture, which includes far more than 
an epistemology of the natural sciences and mathematics. To 
do this, the functional concept becomes the concept of 
symbol.  The “symbol” signifies the link of the rule of the 
function to the multiplicity of the concrete. The relational 
structure of the concept becomes the structure of the concept 
                                                          
1  The critique of this kind of approach came from Horkheimer and 
Adorno in The Dialectic of Enlightenment. They argued that the functional 
concept becomes substance, because all its members are defined according 
to their given task. 
2  Already in the Foreword Cassirer declared that ideas of the PSF 
grew from SF [3].  
of symbol. But in contrast to the concept in Substance and 
Function, working within the domain of natural sciences, the 
concept of symbol is applied to all areas of culture including 
language, mythical thinking and the primary level of 
perception. If in the concept of natural sciences the rules for 
ordering moments are independent from the moments 
themselves, in other cultural domains these rules or functions 
stay in various kinds of relations with its moments. Cassirer 
speaks about three kinds of relations which he called 
symbolic functions. My aim is to prove that the priority of 
relation exists in every definition of the concept of “symbol”. 
For this purpose, we must advance a more detailed 
investigation of symbol in its different symbolic functions. 
While the symbol is the most general concept, which 
includes all kinds of connection of the organizational 
principle with the concrete moment, there are three specific 
symbolic functions. These three functions characterize the 
mode of relation between symbols and symbolized. Cassirer 
named them “expression” (Ausdruck), “representation” 
(Vorstellung) and “signification” (Bedeutung). Expression 
characterizes the mode of relation in the symbolic function 
where the symbol is identified with what is symbolized; the 
meaning of expression is expression, and not something 
different from it. Cassirer defines expression as a kind of 
symbol that becomes essential for the perception of other 
subjects and for the construction of a mythical worldview. 
The perception of other beings' state of mind is conveyed in 
facial and bodily expression [4]. The meaning of an 
expression such as “bad mood” is embodied in the material 
content of that face. A face is not a representation of sadness 
or happiness, but embodies the expression. The same 
undivided unity between a symbol and its meaning is present 
in the non-figurative work of art such as abstract art where 
the composition of form and color has no external 
meaningful representative dimension. We have an immediate 
perception of the composition in non-figurative art.
3
 
Representation is a symbolic function where the relation 
between symbol and symbolized is that of meaning 
represented by content. This mode of relation began with the 
development of language and the apprehension of the world 
in space and time. As animalistic screams were transformed 
into declarative speech, the unity of expression was broken 
by the appearance of the “sign”. In contrast to the “language” 
of screams and bodily expressions, in mature language the 
sequence of sounds or written signs (Cassirer does not 
distinguish between them here) represents or stands for 
something else, namely concepts. The symbolic function of 
representation is at work in more proximate religious 
perceptions. For example, the icon of a God is a 
representation, since it is perceived to be a representation of 
the God and not the God himself. In traditional art the picture 
represents objects, but it is not identified with these objects. 
Yet Cassirer states that in representation there is no total 
separation between the symbolizing function and 
                                                          
3  Cassirer’s scholar J.M. Krois gives an example of this kind of 
symbolic function in the work of Ives Klein, International Klein Blue. This 
is an image of a blue square, which expresses the feeling of cold. The blue 
color of the square is a symbol that does not point to the idea of cold, but 
embodies the feeling of cold [17]. 
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symbolized. Even in language, the first expressive level 
never disappears. The words are always uttered with some 
intonation which has expressive characteristics. Therefore, 
there always remain some subtle resemblances between the 
symbol and the symbolized, the presented and the 
represented.  
The third symbolic function is signification, 
characterized by the complete separation of symbol and 
symbolized, sign and signified. This kind of symbol is pure 
sign, which started to develop with the appearance of 
mathematics. It was most fully realized only with the 
development of the modern scientific-theoretical approach. 
Signification distances itself from any immediate perception 
or anything in the world of concrete things. The scientific 
concept, discussed above as functional concept, is the 
implementation of the third symbolic function. There is no 
resemblance between sign and signified; their connection is 
arbitrary, completely unmotivated. The number two indicates 
any two things; it does not resemble what it signifies. The 
law of gravitation accounts for attraction between masses of 
things, and as a law it is very different from things. As in all 
symbolic functions, the role of sign-symbol is to relate 
between many and one, but the one is very different from 
“many”. 
 Cassirer argues that the priority of the relational or 
symbolic over given elements is already involved in the 
organization of sensory perception, even in expression. The 
unity of material expression and meaning has a potential to 
be divided. Due to the priority of relation, there is no strict 
fixity of perception. Sensory perception may be organized by 
three symbolic functions which open “a guiding point of 
view”. These perceptual possibilities or guiding points 
explain how the same sensory content may be understood in 
different ways. To define the mode of the relationship 
between meaning and senses he introduced the term 
symbolische Prägnanz [22] translated as “symbolic 
pregnance”.4 Symbolic pregnance is the moment of relation 
between meaning and sensory impression, which enables 
different modalities of meaning. It stands for the condition of 
something to be perceived, that is, in the neo-Kantian sense, 
the transcendental principle of cognition [16]. 
IV. THE CONCEPT OF SYMBOL AND NON-IDENTITY 
Cassirer’s concept of symbol is quite vague, especially, 
concerning the first symbolic function — expression. 
Expression is defined as the unity of meaning with sense 
data. It is characterized by its undivided wholeness of 
experience and is also called Erleiden, translated as “a mere 
passivity” [5]. Expression can be defined as meaning 
embodied in sensory perception. Cassirer states that 
expression is an essential moment of perception by which the 
world is initially “revealed” to us [4]. Meaning refers not to a 
particular component of perception but to the whole. It 
cannot be separated from the sensory component. 
Nevertheless, even in expression symbolic pregnance as a 
mode of relation must be prior to the unification of meaning 
with senses. Cassirer often stresses that the meaningful 
                                                          
4  The translation suggested by Krois [16]. 
component of perception is not immediately given in a 
sensory impression; rather it needs to be united with a 
sensory impression in some mode of relation. This raises the 
question whether expression can be consistent with symbolic 
pregnance. On the one hand, expression is defined as an 
immediate, undivided perception; it requires undivided unity 
of perception. On the other hand, symbolic pregnance 
requires the separation of meaning and senses. If expression 
is manifested in the basic moment of perception, as Cassirer 
asserts in the chapter "The Phenomenon of Expression as the 
Basic Factor in the Perceptive Consciousness" in PSF III — 
there will be no separation between meaning and the senses, 
and thus it will be impossible to talk of a mode of relation 
between meaning and sensory perception. 
In PSF Cassirer does not provide an explanation for this 
inconsistency. Instead, he intentionally kept shifting position, 
for which he was criticized by scholars. The Swedish 
philosopher Konrad Marc-Wogau in his 1936 article “Der 
Symbolbegriff in der Philosophie Ernst Cassirer's” claimed 
that the definition of the symbol-concept in PSF contains a 
contradiction. On the one hand, the concept of symbol 
consists of two different moments; on the other hand, the two 
moments of the symbol are united in relation and there is 
therefore only one moment [18]. Marc-Wogau argues that 
this inconsistency is present in all three definitions of 
symbolic function: expression, representation and 
signification. Marc-Wogau's critique of the symbol is 
concerned already with the relational theory of concept in 
Cassirer’s SF. Like Cohen, he claims that it is impossible to 
consider a pure relation without contradiction. According to 
him this contradiction leads to double-thinking 
(Doppelgedanken). In one thought the two moments are 
perceived as one and as two at the same time. In other words, 
if meaning and senses are moments of perception, they are 
united and cannot stay in relation as independent variables. 
However, if they are connected by different mode of relation, 
they cannot be united.  
In articles written in 1936 and 1938 Cassirer responds to 
Marc-Wogau’s critique. He accepts Marc-Wogau’s 
conclusion about double-thinking in the definition of the 
concept of symbol. Cassirer’s purpose was not to hide the 
double-thinking but rather to emphasize it [11]. The double-
thinking manifests the essential relational character of the 
concept of symbol. It is a functional concept, not a generic 
concept. Therefore, Marc-Wogau is correct in saying that the 
concept of symbol includes two divided moments that 
remain in a relationship with each other; they are neither 
completely divided nor completely united. The consequence 
of this relational position is that the two moments are divided 
only in thought; in fact, they are neither divided, nor are they 
united, because they remain in a relationship and are 
considered to be divided. Marc-Wogau, says Cassirer, did 
not accept the fact that the functional concept is not a 
substantive element, based on the logic of identity. In the 
framework of the substantive position, every concept must 
have a fixed meaning, and it has to be consistent with other 
concepts in this framework. The logic of identity presumes 
that concept has a fix meaning. As one cannot think about 
two different things or see two different images 
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simultaneously, one cannot have two inconsistent concepts 
in one thought. But in addition to the logic of identity there is 
logic of non-identity, and it does not require consistency as a 
necessary condition of thinking. The concept of symbol as a 
functional concept does not exist in a way that a thing exists. 
It includes aspects that contradict each other. The primacy of 
relation over existing elements is a result of the functional 
worldview, which dismisses the substantial existence of a 
thing. Critics of Cassirer’s functional concept, as Cohen and 
Marc-Wogau misunderstood this point of inconsistency. 
They initially considered function to be a new substance 
whose existence depends on solid rules or principle of 
reality. However, the inconsistency or double-thinking of the 
concept of symbol definition destroys the substantial 
worldview and reveals a fluid picture with many aspects, 
some of which do not go together with one another. Cassirer 
asserted that the concept of symbol is simultaneously one 
and many, simple and complex [11]. The concept of symbol 
reveals how different symbolic functions generate 
perception. This concept explains how perception includes 
both: the actual unity of meaning and senses together with 
their functional distinction and modality of meaning. There 
is no one fixed and 'right' way to see or to hear. In other 
words, there is no objectively given one world, and every 
perception is an interpretation.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown how Cassirer revised Cohen’s 
epistemology. Knowledge, according to Cohen, is 
constructed by concepts of mind. Yet Cohen’s system of 
knowledge required the principle of reality and was directed 
by a primary defined goal. It can be said, then, that he is a 
fundamentalist regarding knowledge. Cohen's entire system 
of knowledge can be identified with substance – 
unchangeable essence – that is the system in which truth is 
primary defined. Cassirer, who began his philosophical 
career as Cohen’s student, developed a very different 
interpretation of what knowledge is. Advancing Cohen’s task 
to free cognition from unconstructed substantive elements, 
Cassirer introduces the functional concept – the concept of 
symbol – as a main tool of cognition which coherently 
destroys any substantial remainders in Cohen's system of 
knowledge, including the predefined task of knowledge and 
the principle of reality. In his theory of concept, Cassirer 
frees concept from its dependence on existence and provides 
a much more flexible and relational framework than Cohen’s 
approach for scientific and cultural theories. Analyzing 
functional concept, based on relation, Cassirer reveals the 
ambiguous relational nature of every concept, which breaks 
with logical determination. Cassirer’s system of knowledge, 
I claim, avoids any predestination and has no anchors in the 
principle of reality. Consequently, I believe, Cohen’s and 
Cassirer’s epistemology exposes opposite views regarding 
knowledge and reality. While for Cohen knowledge can be 
knowledge only with a solid foundation, Cassirer destroys 
any foundation; he argues for the relative unfixed aspect of 
every system of so called objective knowledge. This position 
(never explicitly enunciated by Cassirer, however), can be 
said to anticipate Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, which argued that there is no such thing as truth 
for scientific knowledge, since its veracity is assured by a 
paradigm, chosen as the best theory.  
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